REGIONAL IMPACTS OF FEDERAL MILK MARKETING ORDER POLICY ALTERNATIVES by Schiek, William A.
Regional Impacts of Federal Milk
Marketing Order Policy Alternatives
William A. Schick
Impacts of alternative federal milk marketing policies which result in reduced fluid (Class I)
milk prices were assessed using a simulation model of the U.S. dairy industry. Results
indicated that milk production, farm milk prices and producer revenues were significantly
reduced in the Southern and Northeast regions of the country under some options. The
regional shares of total U.S. milk production were not significantly altered from those which
would exist under a continuation of the current policy,
There has been much discussion in recent years
about the need for changes in national dairy policy.
While the price support program received most of
the attention in the 1980s, federal milk marketing
orders more recently have come under increasing
scrutiny. In the autumn of 1990, national hearings
were held in several cities to consider proposed
changes to federal orders. Numerous proposals
were received covering many topics, but the ma-
jority pertained to price differentials for Class I
milk including proposals for changes in the level of
Class I price differentials, changes in inter-order
price relationships, and the establishment of mul-
tiple base point pricing (Francis and Novakovic).
While the outcome of the hearings resulted in no
major changes regarding Class I prices, the subject
remains a divisive issue. Recently, the Federal
District Court in Minneapolis ruled the USDA’s
decision not to consider changes in the Class I
price differentials to be arbitrary and capricious
and ordered the Secretary to reconsider changes in
the pricing structure. The issue has been a source
of regional divisiveness with dairy farm groups
and industry leaders in the upper midwest favoring
changes in the federal order Class I pricing struc-
ture, and those in the southern and eastern regions
of the country wanting Class I prices to stay as they
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are. Clearly, the federal milk marketing order de-
bate is not over. The purpose of this research is to
examine the regional consequences of alternative
proposals concerning Class I prices in federal or-
ders,
Federal Milk Order History and Operation
Milk marketing orders have been in existence for
more than 50 years, and for much of that time they
we~e not a source of disharmony among dairy
farmers from different parts of the country. The
purposes of federal orders according to the en-
abling legislation, the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933 and the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 1937, are somewhat vague but encompass
establishing adequate prices to farmers through or-
derly marketing, protecting consumer interests,
providing an orderly and adequate flow of milk to
market, and avoiding unreasonable fluctuations in
milk prices (Babb et al.). Through the years the
objectives that have been used to administer the
program have included promoting orderly market-
ing in fluid milk markets, stabilizing milk prices
and improving the income situation, supervising
the terms of trade in milk markets in such a manner
as to achieve more equality of bargaining between
producers and milk processors, and assuring con-
sumers of adequate supplies of good-quality milk
at reasonable prices (Forrest).
One of the most difficult items to interpret re-
garding these objectives is what is meant by or-
derly marketing. Traditionally, orderly marketing
has been interpreted to mean compliance to a com-
petitive norm in that milk moves to where it is
needed for fluid use at the time it is needed (Ham-208 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
mend and Harris). When the orders were initiated,
producers were at a tremendous disadvantage in
bargaining with respect to processors. This
stemmed in part from the perishable nature of
milk, the relative size and market power of pro-
cessors, the lack of public information regarding
prevailing prices, and the highly seasonal nature of
milk production and demand. Hence, the market
was not purely competitive. To encourage orderly
marketing, order provisions were designed to
equalize the bargaining power between producers
and processors, align prices within orders to en-
courage raw milk supplies located near a particular
processor to move there in preference to a more
distant processor, and align prices between orders
so as to encourage the production of fluid milk
products from the nearest sources of raw milk
(Babb et al.). The enforcement of minimum Class
I price differentials and the interorder pricing
structure is intended to be one means to achieve
these orderly marketing objectives.
Today, federal order regulation of milk markets
is extensive. There are roughly 40 federal milk
marketing orders which regulate approximately 75
percent of all Grade A (fluid grade) milk in the
country. Milk is priced in these orders according to
its use. Milk that is processed and sold in fluid
form receives a Class I designation, milk used to
make perishable manufactured products is as-
signed Class II use, while milk used to make stor-
able products receives a Class HI designation. 1
The Class III price for a given month in all federal
orders is equal to the Minnesota—Wisconsin (M—
W) price for the month. The M—W price is an
average of prices paid by milk plants in Minnesota
and Wisconsin for manufacturing grade (Grade B)
milk. The Class I price is equal to the basic for-
mula price (the M—W price from two months ear-
lier) plus a Class I differential.
The economic justification for Class I differen-
tials is that they represent the added cost of pro-
ducing Grade A milk, the higher value that such
milk has in the marketplace, and the cost of trans-
porting raw milk from the source of reserve sup-
plies, which is represented by a base point in Eau
Claire, Wisconsin (Babb). The transportation cost
component gives rise to the pricing structure where
Class I prices increase with distance from the up-
per midwest. The differentials are set by the
USDA through the hearing process in which in-
dustry representatives give testimony regarding
1 Recently, most orders have adopted a Clnss IIIa designation for
milk used in makhg dry milk puwder. The price for milk used in this
manner has usually been lower than the Class 111price.
their appropriate level. For example, the current
differential added to the M—W price to obtain the
Class I price is $1.20 per hundredweight in Min-
neapolis—St. Paul and $4.18 per hundredweight
in Miami.
Producers in each order receive a uniform or
blend price equal to the sum of the class prices
weighted by the uses of all milk. This concept of
processors and manufacturers paying for milk ac-
cording to how they use it, and producers receiving
a uniform price based on order utilizations is
known as pooling. In addition to the minimum
class prices that processors must pay for milk,
over-order payments are made by processors in
most federal orders to reimburse cooperatives for
the cost of obtaining supplies and providing mar-
keting services. Hence, the effective price received
by a farmer can often be higher than the blend
price. Cooperatives can also apportion losses to
members and both cooperative and proprietary
firms can assess transportation charges to produc-
ers, so the price received by the farmer can like-
wise be lower than the blend price.
Reasons for the Current Debate Over Class
I Prices
Regional conflicts over federal order pricing are
not new (French and Kehrberg), but concerns
about the structure of Class I prices were not in the
forefront during the late 1970s and early 1980s
when increases in milk support prices seemed to
ensure adequate income for many dairy farmers.
During the 1980’s however, the debate regarding
federal orders began to resurface with various
groups divided along regional lines. The resur-
gence of regionalism was due to many factors. The
decline in federal price supports led to falling
prices and put the squeeze on farm incomes (No-
vakovic and Jacobson). Also, changes in technol-
ogy and the relative costs of concentrate feed re-
sulted in the emergence of large-scale dairy oper-
ations with low production costs. These systems
were embraced by many producers in the south and
west, but less so in the traditional regions, leading
to regional shifts in the shares of national milk
production (Jesse and Babb). On top of these
changes in industry structure, the Food Security
Act of 1985 mandated increases in Class I differ-
entials in most orders, but increases were larger in
the south than they were in the upper midwest.
Tensions were exacerbated by these changes be-
cause they differentially benefited producers in the
south, and because they were mandated via the
political process rather than through the customarySchick Impacts of Federal Order Alternatives 209
public hearing process (Novakovic and Jacobson).
These events have resulted in some groups advo-
eating changes in the current Class I differentials,
while others maintain that the current differentials
are appropriate.
Proponents of change maintain that it no longer
makes sense to think of the upper midwest as the
only source of reserve supplies (Anderson). They
point out that Class I utilizations in many federal
order markets are below 60 percent and question
why differentials should be higher in those markets
than in the midwest (Table 1). Also mentioned is
the argument that regional differences in the dif-
ferentials can no longer be justified by cost of pro-
duction (McDowell et al. 1988). Another criticism
is that differentials have been set too high in many
markets, as evidenced by regional shifts in milk
production shares and the fact that supplies of
Grade A miik are well in excess of fluid needs and
reserve requirements. Often cited with respect to
this criticism is the case of the Texas order, which
has seen dramatic increases in production since the
differentiais were increased in 1986 (Novakovic
and Jacobson). Another concern is that the Class I
price is reflective of a limit price, which may be
higher than the competitive equilibrium price for
fluid milk in many regions. Such pricing tech-
niques, it is argued, differentially benefit produc-
ers in regions distant from the upper midwest.
Baiartced against these assertions are the argu-
ments of those who believe that the current system
is both working well and reflective of a competi-
tive solution. They point out that federal order
Table 1. Average Class I Utilizations and
Minimum Class I Differentials for Selected
Federal Order Regional Aggregates
prices in most cases are not the effective Class I
prices and that market forces are acting to adjust
prices through over-order payments (Jesse and
Babb). Another argument in support of the current
structure addresses the limit price issue, noting that
the federal order Class I price structure is not a true
limit price because it represents only about 60 per-
cent of actual transportation costs. Furthermore,
some studies have indicated that the current federai
order price structure is generaily consistent with
competitively determined prices, given the current
regional distribution of production and consump-
tion (Babb; Novakovic and Pratt). A finai point
made is that the Class I differential question is
declining in importance, as such differentials rep-
resent a much smaller percentage of the total milk
price than was the case in prior years (Novakovic
and Jacobson).
The Secretary of Agriculture made no major
changes to the level and interregional alignment of
Class I differentials as a result of the 1990 hear-
ings. Since then, pressure has been building for the
Secretaxy to reconsider possible changes. Against
this backdrop, this research analyzes the impact of
some of the proposals regarding the Class I differ-
entials. While proposed changes have impacts in
alI orders, the magnitude of such impacts can ob-
viously vary on a regional basis. Changes in the
relative price levels would change the total income
from dairying accruing to a particular order or re-
gion. The objective of this analysis is to determine
the impacts of alternative federal order policies on
regional milk production, milk prices, and pro-
ducer revenues, taking into account the dynamic
and spatial aspects of the market.
Model Development





Middle Attantic 50 2.67




Deep South 76 3.26
Lake States 16 1.81
Northern Plains 35 1,54
Southern Plains 47 2.37
Texas 53 3.11
Source: McDowell, H., A. Fleming and R. Fallert. Federal
Milk Marketing Orders: An Analysis of Alternative Policies.
Washington, DC: Economic Research Service, U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, September 1988.
The regional impacts of alternative federal order
policies were simulated using a capacitated
transshipment model of the dairy industry known
as the Dairy Market Policy Simulator (DAMPS).
DAMPS was developed to simulate the impact of
alternative policies on various response variables
in federai and state miik marketing orders and un-
regulated areas (Novakovic et al. 1980; 1991).
Model components include: supplies of Grade A
and Grade B milk, processing activities, demand
for fluid and manufactured products, commercial
and government stocks of manufactured products,
and transportation activities. In the model, each
federal and state milk marketing order has a supply
and demand center associated with it. The inclu-
sion of state regulated areas is important because210 October 1994
California, the largest milk-producing state, does
not have a federal order.
The model’s objective function is to minimize
the sum of the costs of milk assembly, processing,
and product distribution subject to available milk
supply, plant capacities, and consumption require-
ments. The transshipment model is formulated as a
network and is solved using a primal-simplex al-
gorithm (Bradley et al.). A representation of the
network model is shown below.
(1) Min Z CkXk, keA
subject to:
x x~ E x~
(a)
ketl with tail i – kei with head i
= bi, id









supply if i is a supply node;
negative of demand if i is a
demand node; Ootherwise
set of all defined arcs
set of all nodes
cost along arc K
amount of product moved along
arc k
lower bound on arc k
capacity of arc k.
This formula~ion is equivalent to the standard
linear programming (LP) representation of the
transshipment problem. The objective function of
minimizing the sum of assembly, processing, and
distribution costs is defined as minimizing the sum
of total costs over all arcs. The first constraint
encompasses the supply, demand, and balancing
constraints found in traditional LP formulations.
The second constraint defines upper and lower
bounds for movements along particular arcs;
hence, this represents constraints on plant capac-
ity. The network formulation requires that allow-
able arcs are predefine by the set A; therefore,
unrealistic linkages are not considered. Unlike the
simplest transshipment models, DAMPS allows
for milk supply and dairy product demand to re-
spond to changes in prices by incorporating elas-
ticities in a recursive simulation structure. A
change in relative prices in one period will impact
supply and demand quantities in the subsequent
quarter; thus, the model is price responsive and
does not assume fixed quantities for supply and
demand.
DAMPS was modified to include dynamic re-
gional milk supply response parameters for eight
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
regions (Schick 1991). The basic form of the sup-















ypc, * cpft * fins,
f(ypc(L), fins,, cpft, mfrt, t)
g(fms(L), YPC,,cpft, E(mrdt), t)
h(cpf(L), ypc,, frost, E(~dt), t)
annual milk production in year t
annual milk yield per cow in
year t
average herd size (cows per
farm) in year t
number of farms with milk cows
in year t
lag operator where x(L) is Xt_ ~
and X(L2)is xl_ z
milk-feed price ratio in year t
expected relative profitability of
dairying compared to other
activities in year t
expected profitability of milk
production in year t
time trend.
The estimated supply response model is an er-
ror-correction formulation (Engle and Granger)
where the dependent variables are yield per cow,
farm numbers, and cows per farm, Milk produc-
tion is the product of the three dependent variables.
The model is dynamic and includes lagged values
of the endogenous variables, as well as price ex-
pectations variables. The supply response param-
eters were estimated using iterative seemingly un-
related regressions (Judge et al.). A dynamic ap-
proach to supply modeling is necessary because it
may take a number of years for the full impact of
a price change on production to be realized. For
dairy farmers, price changes in previous periods
affect their expectations about current-period
prices, future prices, and the profitability of dair-
ying. Based on these expectations, dairy farmers
may expand or contract the size of their operations,
or even exit the industry. Likewise if price expec-
tations are favorable, new producers may enter the
industry. Static supply models and dynamic mod-
els which do not incorporate firm numbers do not
fully capture these relationships (Veloce and Zell-
ner). Another reason for specifying a dynamic
model of this type relates to arguments that recent
increases in Class I price differentials have been
partially responsible for regional shifts in milk pro-
duction. A dynamic model that allows for firm
entry and exit provides a vehicle for addressing
this issue.
A milk-composite input price ratio is included toSchick Impacts of Federal Order Alternatives 211
represent the profitability of dairying on a per cow
basis. The composite input price is a weighted av-
erage of feed prices, hay prices, and agricultural
wage rates. A milk-labor price ratio is used as a
proxy for the profitability of dairying, relative to
other enterprises in which the owner-operator
could be employed. The expectations for the milk-
composite input price were assumed to be a single
average of the previous four years’ price changes,
while expectations for the milk-labor price ratio
were determined by identifying the autoregressive-
moving average (ARMA) process in the series,
and using the estimates of the ARMA model as
price expectations. A summary of the regional
own-price elasticities generated by this model is
presented in Table 2.
The regional supply response estimates were in-
corporated in DAMPS and the simulation model is
solved recursively. Regional milk production is
determined according to the supply response
model. These results become the milk production
data used by DAMPS to determine the cost-
minimizing solution to the transshipment problem,
Average farm milk prices are computed by
DAMPS based on milk utilization in each region
and these data are used by the regional supply
models to determine the next period’s production.
Policy Simulation
For the purposes of poIicy simulation, it is neces-
sary to establish a baseline to serve as a compari-
son for various scenarios. Five years were simu-
lated for the baseline and for each policy altern-
ative.While results were generated for all federal
and state milk marketing orders, only annual sum-
Table 2. Cumulative Own-Price Elasticities
of Milk Production Through Year 5
by Region
---------------------- Year ----------------------
Region 1 2 3 4 5
Corn Belt 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.18
North Centrat 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.24
Northeast 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.28
Pacific 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.28 0.35
South Central 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.17 0.07
Southeast 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.17
Southwest 0.00 0.12 0.20 0.33 0.47
Mountain 0.07 0.12 0.25 0,39 0.47
Source: Schick, W.A. Regional Farm Structure Impacts of Llo-
vine Soma?orropin Adoption. Staff Paper No. 94-16, Depart-
ment of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West La-
fayette, IN, August 1994.
mary data for regional aggregates are reported
here. The regions used in this study are shown in
Figure 1. These regional delineations differ from
those usually used by the USDA. Attempts were
made to make these state groupings more consis-
tent with respect to trends in average herd size,
milk production, yield per cow, and the dominant
type of milk production system in use. Percentage
changes in milk production, production share,
farm milk price and gross producer revenue under
the baseline after 5 years are shown in Table 3.
Federal Order Policy Scenarios
While a number of issues were considered at the
national hearings on Federal Milk Marketing or-
ders, many of the proposals regarding Class I dif-
ferentials are reflected by the four policies exam-
ined here. These alternatives represent proposals
that were submitted prior to the 1990 hearings
(Francis and Novakovic). The scenarios analyzed
include the following: multiple base point pricing,
reinstatement of Class I price differentials that ex-
isted before 1986, the elimination of the Grade A
differential and the establishment of uniform
(fixed) Class I price differentials in all orders.
Multiple base point pricing. In this scenario, it
was assumed that the Class I differential was equal
to $1.20 per hundredweight in all orders having
adequate milk production to satisfy fluid use re-
quirements (Class I sales plus a necessary reserve).
The exceptions to the $1.20 differential rule are
orders that must acquire supplemental milk to meet
fluid consumption requirements. In these orders
the minimum Class I differentials were set in ac-
cordance with a competitive model at levels that
were required to attract supplemental milk supplies
during deficit periods (McDowell et al. 1990).
These differentials ranged from a high of $5.03 per
hundredweight in Florida to a low of $1.57 in Lou-
isiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas. California
which does not have a federal order was assigned
a Class I differential of $0.87 per hundredweight,
the applicable level during the year (Table 4). In
addition to the minimum differentials, the cost of
intraregional fluid milk marketing was added to the
Class I prices to reflect the minimum over-order
premiums that would prevail. These costs
amounted to an additional $0.65 per hundred-
weight in orders east of the Rocky Mountains and
$0.45 per hundredweight in orders west of the
Rockies.
1985 Class I differentials. Some of the propos-
als submitted at the federal order hearings in the
autumn of 1990 called for a reinstatement of the212 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Figure 1. Milk Production Regions Used in This Study.
Class I differentials in effect prior to the changes
that were made in 1986 under the 1985 farm bill.
The level of the 1985 Class I differentials were
obtained from Federal Milk Market Order Statis-
tics (USDA 1985). For the purposes of this simu-
lation, it was assumed that over-order premiums
would continue at base-year levels. In reality, the
over-order premiums could be expected to change
when the minimum differentials change. However,
there was no basis for predicting how much the
premiums would change.
Table 3. Baseline Simulation Results,
Five-Year Percentage Changes in Selected
Variables by Region
Gross
Milk Production ~% Producer










percentage change from base year
4.1 -0.6 –0.2 3.9
3.0 –2.1 –0.0 3.0
5.3 –1.2 –0.5 4.7
25.4 2,2 –0,6 24.6
2.2 –0.5 0.2 2.3
13.7 0.1 –2.0 11.5
54.5 2.0 –5.2 46.5
13.9 0.1 –0.5 13.4
10.9 . –0.8 10.0
Elimination of the Grade A differential. The
elimination of the Grade A differential has been
discussed. This differential is supposed to reflect
the added cost of Grade A milk production and the
higher value of such milk in the marketplace.
Modeling the impact of eliminating this differen-
tial would involve reducing Class I differentials in
all federal and state orders by a fixed amount. This
scenario was simulated by reducing Class I differ-
entials in all orders by $0.50 per hundredweight
(Schwart et al), Over-order premiums were as-
sumed to continue at base-year levels.
Establishment of uniform (’fixed)Class I differ-
entials. Some proposals at the federal order hear-
ings called for the establishment of uniform Class
I differentials in all federal orders. Several levels
for the uniform differential were proposed, with
$1.80 per hundredweight being the most frequent
choice, For the purposes of this simulation, all
Class I differentials were reduced to $1.80 per
hundredweight plus the applicable over-order pre-
miums that were in effect during the base year.
National Impacts
For each of the federal order policies examined,
the Class II and Class III prices and all input pricesSchick Impacts of Federal Order Alternatives 213
Table 4. C1ass I Differentials in Federal and State Milk Orders Under a Multiple Base Point
Pricing Plan
Order Differential Order Differential
Upper Florida 5.03 Central Arkansas 1.57
Tampa Bay 5.03 Lou-Lex-Evans. 2.05
S.E. Florida 5.03 Paducah 2.05
Alabama-W. Florida 2.95 Nashville 2.05
Georgia 2.95 Memphis 2.05
North Carolina 2.95 Tennessee Valley 2.05
South Carolina 2.95 California 0.87
Greater Louisiana 1.57
New Orleans-Miss. 1.57 All Others 1.20
Source: McDowell, H., A. Fleming and F. Spinelli. U.S. Milk Markets Under Alternative Federal Order Pricing Policies,
Washington, DC: Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, November 1990.
were maintained at base-year levels. The results
are reported as changes in the year 5 projected
value from the projected year 5 baseline value.
Hence, references to decreases or increases in a
particular response variable are expressed relative
to what would have occurred in the absence of the
policy change. Such responses are not increases or
decreases relative to the initial state (year O).
The aggregate impact of the four federal order
policy alternatives on selected variables is shown
in Table 5. Milk production decreases slightly un-
der each of the four scenarios. This result was
expected since under the assumptions employed
here, all of the policies involve reductions in milk
prices. Producer revenues also fall, as do con-
sumer expenditures and government removals.
Fluid utilization increases as a result of the com-
bined effect of decreased production and increased
consumption caused by lower milk prices. Impacts
are greatest under the multiple base point pricing
plan since this scenario involves the greatest aver-
age price reduction from base run levels (2.7 per-
cent). However, the national-level impacts on
these variables are small in all cases.
Regional Impacts
Regional milk production declines under each of
the federal order policies in almost every case (Ta-
ble 6). The exception is the Pacific region, which
shows a modest increase in production relative to
the baseline under multiple base point pricing, and
the North Central region, which shows an increase
under fixed differentials. The reductions in re-
gional production are greatest in the Northeast,
Southeast, and Southwest. Such results are not sur-
prising because these regions experience greater
price reductions than other regions under the pol-
icies examined (Table 7). However, note that the
reductions in milk production in the South Central
region are relatively small, even though this region
has the second greatest decrease in milk price (Ta-
bles 6 and 7). Dairy farmers in the South Central
region, which includes Tennessee and Kentucky,
probably have fewer alternative uses for their land
and other inputs than farmers in the Southeast,
Northeast, and Southwest. Hence, many farmers
in the South Central region may continue dairying
even in the face of declining prices because few
Table 5. Federal Order Policy Simulation Results for Selected Response Variables
Net
Milk Milk Producer Consumer Government Fluid
Production Price Revenues Expenditures Removals Utilization
billion dollars billion billion percent percent
pounds per cwt. dollars dollars (fat basis)
Baseline
Year O 145.01 12.24 17.75 31.12 6.3 40.6
Year 5 160.75 12.14 19.51 35.59 8.7 37.1
percentage change in simulated Year 5 values
relative to Year 5 Baseline values
Multiple Base Points –0.7 –2.7 -3.4 –1.2 – 0.6 1.9
1985Differentials –0.2 –0.9 –1.1 –0.5 –0.2 0.8
No Grade A -0.4 –1.4 -1.9 –0.8 -0.4 0.8
Fixed Differentials –0.5 –1.8 –2.3 –1.1 -0.5 1.4214 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 6. Federal Order Simulation Results for Regional Milk Production, Percentage Change
from Baseline Values
Corn North South
Belt Central Northeast Pacific Central Southeast Southwest Mountain
billion pounds
Baseline
Year O 14.72 43.49 35.09 24.36 8.75 5.62 7.47 5.50
Year 5 15.33 44.79 36.95 30.54 8.94 6.40 11,54 6.26
percentage change in simulated Year 5 values
relative to Year 5 Baseline values
Multiple Base Point –0.3 –0.1 –1.6 0.4 –0.4 –2.0 -3.0 –1.1
1985Differentials –0.2 –0.1 –0.2 0.0 –0.2 –0.5 –1.2 -0.3
No Grade A –0.3 –0.2 –0.5 – 0.5 –0.1 –0.4 -0.9 – 0.8
Fixed Differentials –0.2 0.1 –1.1 0.0 –0.4 –1.3 –2.2 –0.6
alternatives are available. As was the case for na-
tional aggregate results, multiple base point pric-
ing had the greatest impact of any policy on re-
gional production,
When compared to the baseline, milk prices are
lower under the federal order policy alternatives in
almost all cases. Again, the exceptions are the Pa-
cific region under multiple base point pricing and
the North Central region under fixed differentials
(Table 7). The greatest price impacts are in regions
which currently have high Class I differentials or
high fluid utilizations, such as the Northeast,
Southeast, South Central, and Southwest. Any
plan that lowers differentials would have the
strongest impact in these regions. In all cases, the
Southeast and South Central regions experience
the greatest change in milk prices. However, under
a multiple base point policy, the impact in the
southeast is magnified because the high over-order
premiums which existed in the base year were not
carried forward in the simulation. The level of
prices under this scenario were determined to be
those required to induce adequate supplies of milk
to move during deficit periods (McDowell et al.
1990).
Table 7. Federal Order Simulation Results for
Baseline Values
Impacts in the Pacific region are heavily influ-
enced by impacts on California. The increase in
the Class I price in California under multiple base
point pricing is due to the inclusion of interregional
marketing costs in the effective Class I price which
was not assumed under the baseline. This assump-
tion was made under the multiple base point sce-
nario to maintain consistency with an earlier study
(McDowell et al. 1990). Under the elimination of
the Grade A differential, California was treated the
same as federal orders and received a 50 cent re-
duction in its Class I price, something which
would not necessarily occur if this policy were
adopted, as only those areas regulated by federal
orders would be required to comply.
The impact on regional producer revenues mir-
rors that of milk prices. The Southeast, Southwest,
South Central, and Northeast regions experience
the greatest decreases in gross producer revenues
when compared to the baseline (Table 8). Multiple
base point pricing generally has the greatest impact
(0.5 to 14.1 percent) followed by the uniform dif-
ferential policy (O.1 to 8.9 percent). A return to
1985 differentials and the elimination of Grade A
differentials have more modest effects, although
Regional Milk Price, Percentage Change from
Corn North South
Belt Central Northeast Pacific Central Southeast Southwest Mountain
dollars per hundredweight
Baseline
Year O 12,06 11.92 12.71 11.21 13,18 14.78 12.88 11.84
Year 5 12,04 11.91 12,65 11.14 13.20 14.49 12,22 11.78
percentage change in simulated Year 5 values
relative to Year 5 Baseline values
Multiple Base Points –1.4 –0.4 –5.3 1.0 –5.5 – 12.3 -4.6 –1.9
1985Differentials –1.2 –0.2 –0.8 0.0 –3,4 –3.0 –1.9 –0,5
No Grade A –1.4 –0.8 –1.8 –1.3 –2.3 –2.5 -1.4 –1.5
Fixed Differentials –0.8 0.6 –3.6 –0,1 –5.5 –7,7 –3.5 –1.3Schick Impacts of Federal Order Alternatives 215
Tab1e8. FederalOrder Simulation Results for Regional Producer Revenues, Percentage
Change from Baseline Values
corn North South
Belt Central Northeast Pacific Central Southeast Southwest Mountain
billion dollars
Baseline
Year O 1.78 5.18 4.46 2.73 1.15 0.83 0.96 0.65
Year 5 1.85 5.34 4,67 3.40 1.18 0.93 1.41 0.74
percentage change in simulated Year 5 values
from Year 5 Baseline values
Multiple Base Points -1.7 – 0.5 – 6.8 1.4 –5.8 – 14.1 -7.4 –3.0
1985Differentials –1,4 –0.3 –1.0 0.0 -3.7 –3.5 -3.0 –0.8
No Grade A –1.7 -1.0 –2.3 –1.8 –2.4 -3.0 –2.3 -2.3
Fixed Differentials –0.9 0,7 –4.7 –0.1 –5.8 -8.9 –5.6 %1.9
eliminating the Grade A differentials has a propor-
tionately greater impact than a return to 1985 pric-
ing in the Mountain and Pacific regions where
Class I differentials are already small. In these re-
gions, the Grade A differential represents a larger
percentage of the Class I milk price. In general, the
impact of a return to 1985 differentials is larger in
regions distant from the upper midwest (east of the
Rocky Mountains) and in regions with high fluid
utilizations. The impact of eliminating the Grade A
differential varies directly with the regional Class I
utilization percentage. One should note that under
the fixed differential, the North Central region is
the only one to experience an increase relative to
the baseline in milk production, prices and reve-
nue. Given this, it is not surprising that this option
was put forward and supported by a coalition of
cooperatives and processors in the upper midwest,
The alternative policies result in very little
change in the regional production shares relative to
the baseline (Table 9). The forces at work causing
regional shifts in milk productions appear to go
beyond the influences of federal order pricing.
These results suggest that changes in the Class I
price differentials will not stem the exodus of milk
producers or the decline of milk production in the
North Central and Corn Belt regions, nor will they
stop the expansion of milk production in the South-
west and Pacific regions.
Conclusions
Given the assumptions used in this study, the fed-
eral order policies examined do not substantially
impact aggregate U.S. milk production, prices, or
producer revenues. The average U.S. milk price
falls at most by about 2.6 percent under multiple
base point pricing and 1.8 percent under uniform
Class I differentials. The differences in the impacts
on regional production, milk price, and producer
revenues were more striking. Clearly the biggest
losers under any of the proposed changes are the
Southern regions and the Northeast as they suffer
the biggest reductions in average milk prices and
aggregate producer revenues. The Southeast expe-
riences the most severe consequences and is par-
ticularly hard hit under the multiple base point
pricing policy with a milk price decrease of over
12 percent and an aggregate revenue decrease of
Table 9. Regional Shares of U.S. Milk Production Under Baseline and Federal Order
Policy Alternatives
Corn North south
Belt Central Northeast Pacific Central Southeast Southwest Mountain
Baseline
percent of U.S. milk production
Year O 10.2 30.0 24.2 16.8 6.0 3.9 5.2 3.8
Year 5 9.5 27.9 23.0 19.0 5.6 4.0 7.2 3.9
production shares in Year 5 under alternative
federal order policy scenarios
Multiple Base Point 9.6 28.0 22.8 19.2 5.6 3.9 7.0 3.9
1985Differentials 9.5 27.9 23.0 19.0 5.6 4.0 7.1 3.9
No Grade A 9.5 27.9 23.0 19.0 5.6 4.0 7.1 3.9
Fixed Differentials 9.6 28.0 22.8 19.1 5.6 3.9 7.1 3.9216 October 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
over 14 percent. It is important to mention that
these results carry the implicit assumption that
over-order payments do not adjust under the new
policy, which is obviously unrealistic. Given the
high Class I utilization in the Southeast, periodic
deficits in milk for fluid use are likely to occur. At
such times, the effective Class I price might be bid
up to reflect transportation costs and prices in the
closest milk exporting region. Hence, the actual
impact in the Southeast and South Central regions
may not be as large as projected here.
The regions which fare the best under these pol-
icies are the North Central and Pacific regions. The
North Central region is perhaps a bigger long term
gainer because of its proximity to the markets
where production is reduced. Because the North
Central region is the residual supplier of fluid milk
to the southern markets, it will likely experience an
increase in its share of fluid milk sales in those
markets when production there is reduced. It is
therefore understandable why the North Central re-
gion’s dairy cooperatives are advocates of chang-
ing the federal orders in the direction of reducing
or eliminating inter-order price differences. How-
ever, depending on how over-order premiums ad-
just, such policy changes may result in little over-
all benefit for producer groups in the North Central
region. Furthermore, it does not appear that they
will reverse the shifts in regional production that
have already occurred, nor will they halt the con-
tinuation of these trends.
This research examined the impact of various
proposals for changes in Class I differentials in
federal orders on regional milk production, farm
milk prices, and producer revenues. These results
do not make any claim about the overall economic
efficiency of the various alternatives compared to
the current policy, but merely addresses the distri-
bution of producer benefits among regions. All of
the options analyzed reduce Class I prices in most
orders. The most obvious economic justification
for them is that they reduce regulated minimum
prices, allowing market forces to have greater in-
fluence over the actual market price, and reducing
any arbitrary enhancement of prices in some re-
gions over others. Reducing regulation may allow
consumers greater latitude in demonstrating de-
mand and generating value for milk and milk prod-
ucts and producers are better able to respond with
any comparative or cost advantage they may have.
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